men/ but, of£ these, Runyori's division, consisting of 5,752 men, was required to guard the roads in the rear of the army.[2] McDowell thus disposed of about 30,000 men for the actual conflict of arms. This gave him a superiority on the field of battle of some 8,000 men over Beauregard's army.

But it was obviously impossible to consider an advance upon Manassas without taking account of the two armies which confronted each other in the Shenandoah Valley. The possibility of Johnston's joining his force, or a great part of it, to that of Beauregard was clearly recognized **by** the Federal commander-in-chief, General Scott It was seen that either Johnston must be detained in the Valley by Patterson, or Patterson must unite his army to that of McDowell; it was never supposed that McDowell alone could defeat Beauregard and Johnston together.

The operation on which the Federal authorities had decided was, therefore, without controversy, a somewhat complicated one, no matter how approached ; and in the beginnings **of** warn, and especially when troops are raw and t^cmemls inexperienced, it is a tempting of fortune for the party which has the superiority in physical force to subject the issue of arms to the accidents winch invaria-

bly happen in all co-operative movements; it is far wiser to eliminate by simplicity of plan the chances of mistake or misunderstanding. In the case before

[1] 2 W. R., 309. Apparently the " aggregate " of the 4th brigade of the 1st division is not included in this figure.
«.#., 318.